Risks
In implementing the Bridge Project and operating in South Sudan, Caritas Switzerland is facing a number of risks. The most important threats include:
- The possibility of resurgence of civil war;
- The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and other armed groups may cause instability in the catchment area;
- Tribal and/or cattle raids;
- Large numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and returnees could overstretch the available resources and services or cause conflict with the local communities; and
- Lack of community participation may have an adverse impact on the project by reducing its community ownership, thereby reduced sustainability.
Assumptions
By and large, the Bridge Project assumes that the above-mentioned risks will not materialise during the implementation of the project. It is therefore assumed that there will be a functioning government, that there will be relative peace in Eastern Equatoria and that development activities will accelerate. It had also rightly anticipated that there would be a stronger political will to drive the LRA out of the region and that the area along the border between Uganda and Sudan would become safer. Furthermore, it is assumed that transport and communications as well as the overall infrastructure in the region will improve, substantially reducing project cost. Finally, it is expected that cooperation with other agencies will continue. So far, all assumptions have proved to be valid and it is hoped that the situation will gradually continue to improve.
Constraints
Development processes in a context such as South Sudan are slow and benchmarks cannot be as high as those in relatively more developed contexts. The Bridge Project is facing a number of constraints, which have hampered effective and efficient implementation of the proposed activities. This section highlights the greatest constraints faced by the Bridge Project.
Availability of Local Materials
There is a chronic lack of construction such as bricks, sand, cement, aggregate and ballast in South Sudan. This has delayed the progress in the construction of the base camp and has similarly affected the school and health centre construction. The above-mentioned materials are scarce and correspondingly expensive. Transport has been difficult to arrange and it was necessary at times to hire Kenyan lorries from Lokichoggio to keep the work going. This has made the progress of the construction slow and very costly.
Insecurity in the Catchment Area
In the initial phases of the Bridge Project, insecurity in the catchment areas has hampered the provision of and access to basic services in that it has hindered movements of the project team to the project areas and delayed direct contact between project staff and beneficiaries. Insecurity has resulted from three sources: the LRA, tribal clashes that result from cattle raiding across counties and conflicts over resource utilisation, especially between farmers and pastoralists in the western part of the state. As a result of the negative effects on the overall progress of the project, changes in the operational areas were considered. However, since the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed between the LRA and government of Uganda in August 2006 and a further addendum was signed in November, the situation in Eastern Equatoria started to change; the situation significantly improved in terms of security. To date, however, the situation in Magwi County remains relatively more precarious and warrants extra caution.
Coordination Among International NGOs
Poor coordination of activities among International Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the state has been another constraint faced by the project; particularly in the initial stages, coordination was lacking. In an effort to redress this situation, the Bridge Project assisted the Ministries of Education Science and Technology (MoEST), Public Works and Health in planning and funding state-wide stakeholder and partner workshops. This helped the ministries to map all NGO activities taking place in Eastern Equatoria and paved the way for the State Strategic Planning Meeting. To date, the Bridge Project continues to play a vocal role in improving coordination between actors in the state.
Community Mobilisation and Ownership
Although the Bridge Project prides itself on its achievements pertaining to community mobilisation and ownership, the process is challenging and, at times, rather slow. As was mentioned earlier, communities are required to contribute, in-kind, to project costs in order to increase the value of projects to beneficiaries and boost ownership for them. In many cases, this demand is met with reluctance. This difficulty has a cultural component but has been exacerbated by the approaches employed by other NGOs, some of whom, for instance, have paid community members for their contributions. This is really a matter of shifting from dependence on humanitarian efforts to playing a more assertive role required of communities for development work. The Bridge Project thus continues to spend considerable amounts of time convincing communities; to have them understand and accept their roles. Direct contact with the beneficiaries as well as involving the government through rallies and the church leader during prayers on Sundays have proven to be useful means in passing on the message concerning the importance of community contribution.
Construction Costs Versus Budget
Construction costs have put a great strain on the project’s budget. The high prices result from the scarcity of local construction materials and the high costs involved in importing them from neighbouring Kenya. Prices were far above the figures mentioned in the budget, requiring an urgent review of the budget. Consequently, out of the four schools mentioned in the project document, only two can be built within the available budget. Remaining money will be used to construct additional classrooms in existing schools.
Roads and Accessibility
The catchment area has a network of all-weather dirt roads but these roads have been rendered insecure by the war, poor maintenance, insecurity, mines and LRA ambushes. The road conditions are extremely poor; access is extremely difficult, especially during the wet season. However, with the continuation of road construction works, it is expected that the situation will rapidly improve. The construction of the Torit – Juba road, for instance, has made access to Juba and the GoSS offices easier. The pictures below illustrate the poor road conditions.
